The Common Law
One of the reasons why so many people died when the RMS Titanic sank in 1912 was because the Board of Trade rules relating to the number (and capacity) of lifeboats that had to be carried on such a ship had not been changed since 1894. Those rules were based upon the tonnage of ships rather than on the number of passengers and crew carried in them. 5 Although the Titanic had carried more lifeboats, floats, and rafts than the Board of Trade rules then required (sufficient to save 1,178 lives instead of the 'statutory' number of 962) even this capacity would have saved no more than 52% of the 2,207 people on board. 6 In fact only 651 people were lowered into the boats. 7 This paper is not about the Titanic disaster, nor is that notorious example of 'legislative negligence' the only inspiration for the ideas which this paper now wishes to address. But the loss of life in that disaster and the disaster itself are being used to illustrate three points:
1. Legislative negligence is not limited to instances where pure economic loss is caused to individuals. Such negligence can also cause loss of life and personal injuries. 8 Thus, even if we accept the Murphy 9 principle -that the tort of negligence should not normally extend to instances of pure economic loss -the consequences of legislative negligence can be more serious than this. 10 5 The 1894 Rules for Life-Saving Appliances, made under s.427, Merchant Shipping Act 1894, did no more than treat the Titanic as a vessel of 'over 10,000 tons', even though it was a vessel of the unprecedented tonnage of 46,328 tons. 6 W. Lord, A Night to Remember (London: Penguin ed., 1978) p127. 7 Ibid, p197. 8 For another example of legislation which might endanger health and safety see the Building Regulations relating to thermal insulation and their failure to take account of indoor exposure to radon gas. This exposure is estimated to cause 2,500 lung cancer deaths per year in the U.K. It is difficult to see how any promoter of new thermal insulation regulations could rely on the 'state of the art' defence when the risks of such deaths have already been widely publicised even to students. See: 'Dealing with radon gas' [by P. Adams], 'Mainly for Students' series, Estates Gazette, 9 December 1989. 2. Legislative negligence is not confined to primary legislation enacted by a sovereign legislature. Secondary legislation (and quasi-legislation) drafted by someone in a government department, local authority, or statutory body is just as likely to be affected. Secondary legislation enacted under delegated powers receives no Parliamentary scrutiny. As the law lords have impliedly recognised, it would be an over-generous interpretation of the Bill of Rights 1688 to give to modern delegated legislation the same immunity from judicial scrutiny which is given, by that statute, to 'freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament '. 11 3. Legislative negligence includes failing to revoke or to amend out of date legislation, no less than it includes enacting defective legislation in the first placeassuming, of course, that a government minister had been obligated by Parliament to keep that legislation under review.
What is Legislative Negligence?
The concept of negligence imports a high threshold to making any claim. The definition encompasses instances in a European context where a Member State has failed to implement legislation or to fulfil its Community or international obligations.
In the case of legislative institutions, problems arise over the 'legislative soup' created by the activities of those institutions. These activities are not confined to what occurs within a single institution. Legislative activity involves a complex web of interacting individuals acting within the constraints of a number of institutional settings. Each of these institutions functions in accordance with its own priorities and ways of doing business. They are all subject to the personal agendas of human actors and the capacity of these individuals to rationalise and obscure (what has been termed) their 'vocabularies of motive'. 12 Despite such pluralism there remains an overriding concern for efficiency and fairness in the way legislation is produced. Where harm is found to be directly attributable to legislative action (and inaction in cases where this Legislative negligence is not the same thing as the enactment of an unpopular or unwise law; still less is it the enactment of a law without foreseeing the unintended consequences of the policy behind it. It is not directly concerned with ineffective legislation 13 or, more generally, with the failure of legislative measures or the process of reform. 14 Clearly, a policy may be unpopular, aberrant, quirky, old-fashioned, short-sighted, or even unreasonable (in the ordinary sense of that word) without it being unlawful. 15 Legislative negligence, in the context of this paper, means such an obvious inattention to the consequences of the wording of legislation that, if such workmanship had been perpetrated by a lawyer drafting a lease, will, trust deed, or any other legal document, it would have amounted to professional negligence. This limitation should be enough to answer any allegation that such a cause of action would enable floods of discontented voters to claim damages at common law from their lawgivers. 16 Placing the threshold for a cause of action as high as this begs the question of whether other forms of redress are needed to compensate for incompetence in drafting legislation where an individual suffers financial or other harm directly as a result of the wrongful act or omission.
Legislative negligence is not a cause of action entitling anyone to question the policies which (for good or ill) have inspired primary or secondary legislation. There may be other procedures for doing that. 17 Legislative negligence is a cause of action arising out of the damage which has been caused by the failure of a government department or legislative draftsman to attend to the obvious adverse consequences 18 of the legislation which the department is promoting. It is as if a solicitor was asked by a landlord to draft a business lease but drafted a rent review clause which (for 21 years or more) had had the effect of producing less than the market rent 19 , or as if such a solicitor omitted the user covenant or some of the other covenants intended to be binding on the tenant.
Negligence in Primary Legislation
It would be highly unusual to find examples of legislation that had deliberately been th ed., 2007) refers to one case where a negligently typed codicil to a will would have had the effect, if the Chancery Division had not intervened, of revoking the whole of clause 7 of the original will, instead of revoking only 'clause 7(iv)' as the testator had intended: Re Morris [1971] It is in the public interest that the criminal law and its procedures, so far as possible, be clear and straightforward so that all those directly affected, in particular, defendants, victims, the police, the probation service, jurors, lawyers for defence or prosecution, judges and magistrates, professional and lay, should be readily able to understand it. Sadly the provisions of the in pre-metric terms, an inch thick. The provisions which we have considered have been brought into force prematurely, before appropriate training could be given by the Judicial Studies Board or otherwise to approximately 2,000
Crown Court and Supreme Court judges and 30,000 magistrates. In the meantime, the judiciary and, no doubt, the many criminal justice agencies for which this Court cannot speak, must, in the phrase familiar during the Second World War "make do and mend". That is what we have been obliged to do in the present appeal and it has been an unsatisfactory activity, wasteful of scarce resources in public money and judicial time.
The Need for Precision in Property Law
Examples of legislative negligence can be found in almost every area of the law, even in those areas where certainty is supposed to be the pearl of great price. A subsequent case involving joint landlords, heard in the Court of Appeal, decided the issue in favour of the landlords. 25 The unsuccessful resident landlord in the earlier county court case, which had been decided in favour of the tenant, had, by that time, already paid his tenant in order to obtain vacant possession of the demised premises. 26 He afterwards sought advice about whether he could sue the appropriate government 
Questions Facing the Common Law
The drafting ambiguity in the Rent Act 1977, which led to the conflicting decisions discussed above, gives rise to three cardinal questions: 
The European Dimension
Regulatory law in the UK is increasingly being shaped from a European perspective.
Such law does not fit comfortably with common law traditions and can be slow to respond to fresh demands. 34 There is also a tradition of mythologizing about the common law. 35 European law has been widely criticised for being obscure, complex and inaccessible. 36 Accusations abound that the statutory law of the EC has become so burdensome and inflexible that it is damaging business, the economy and the prospects of European citizens. 37 The production and accumulation of law in the EU has been truly staggering. Issues of relevance, accuracy, context, legitimacy, transparency all conspire to affect the law and its subsequent application. The quality of drafting raises major concerns, whether these arise from typographical errors, omissions, ambiguities, obsolescence, negligence or insufficient consultation. The problems which the EU faces are, therefore, exactly the same as those faced in other jurisdictions, possibly more so, given that much of the legislation is concerned with technical standards and a requirement to transpose policy into 21 languages.
These problems are compounded by the legislative process. Briefly, drafting is in the hands of the Directorate General of the Commission, who is mainly concerned with the subject matter. The draftsman will usually be an expert in the field, but not necessarily a lawyer. The initial draft has to be passed on to the Commission's Legal
Service. This process looks to the legal basis of the Treaty and is not primarily
concerned with the precise details of the text. The draft then goes to the Commission for approval, and, if approved, is then translated. 38 Errors may be identified through this process, but due to translation problems some will be perpetuated or not identified at all. These processes take place before political 'horse-trading' within the Council starts. By this stage, political considerations, including the need for compromise and urgency, may prevail over the aim of producing legislation free from errors, omissions and ambiguities. In reality, much legislation and quasi-legislation is not given this level of scrutiny, particularly in highly technical areas of regulatory law. either on time or in the correct form, is there a sound argument for denying the extension of liability to legislation that has been drafted in a truly negligent way?
Critics of the introduction of such a concept may resort to a variant of the 'floodgates' argument. If an argument against introducing an action in legislative negligence is that it would bring a flood of litigants to the doors of the Court, then one need only draw a parallel with the number of successful cases brought in respect of State Liability. Here, the numbers are very low. Why, then, argue for a concept that is unlikely to be successful in any but the most persistent and disadvantaged cases? Part of the answer is that the threat of use is likely to be more effective than actual use.
State Liability was developed as a result of a failure by Member States to complete the Single Market agenda and one reason given by the ECJ for its development was that the prospect of imposing liability resulting in damages would encourage Member
States to fulfil their commitments. On the other hand, the introduction of a new tort for grounding a claim of legislative negligence would provide legislators with a powerful incentive to ensure that legislation is soundly based and correctly formulated. A potential liability in damages would help to tighten up the drafting process and improve the quality of legislation.
Using State Liability as a template, it is unlikely that the introduction of liability for negligent drafting in England and Wales (or in other EU Member States) would result in a flood of litigation, inhibit the drafting of legislation, or cause compensation to be awarded in any but the most deserving of cases. The contemporary system of State Liability is by no means perfect, but it signposts a concept that is already operational in the legal systems of all 27 Member States. These conditions, the authors argue, preclude any constitutional argument that might be used to resist the development of such a principle within a national legal system.
Non-Contractual Liability and the Institutions of the European Union
Having analysed State Liability, it is pertinent to take the European case a step further and to examine the extent to which the EU institutions can be held liable for negligence. Community non-contractual liability is governed by Articles 235 49 and 288 50 . These Articles are Delphic and vague. In principle, the Community is liable for any damage which it causes, whether by its institutions 51 or by its employees. 52 Article 288(2) requires Community courts to determine liability 'in accordance with the general principles of the Member States'. 53 The prevailing academic opinion is that the intention of the treaty drafters was to empower the ECJ to 'develop a The following analysis will focus on the last two of these.
It has been argued that when Article 288 came into effect it was unclear whether the compensation provision was to be used as a sanction against non-compliant institutions, or whether it was intended to resolve grievances between the institutions and individuals. 58 This ambiguity pervades the two routes by which it is possible to challenge poorly-drafted legislation. The first of these comprise challenges that result from the effects of the legislation. Secondly, it may be possible to challenge the institutions by focusing on administrative acts: on the behaviour that preceded the legislation. As is highlighted in the following discussion, with both of these there are similarities in the requirements needed to establish a successful claim.
Legislative Acts
Where a legislative act does not entail any meaningful discretionary choice then it will normally suffice to show the existence of illegality, causation and damage. 59 Craig 60 notes that 'it is possible to list a variety of errors which might lead to liability'. 61 Given the predominately economic background to the Union in its early years, it is no surprise that much of the early case law on the legislative aspect of
Article 288 deals with parts of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Where legislative action involves economic policy measures, it has been held that the Community does not incur non-contractual liability for damage suffered by individuals as a consequence of that action, unless a sufficiently flagrant violation of a superior rule of law for the protection of the individual has occurred. These conditions have come to be known as the Schoppenstedt criteria. 62 The distinction between legislative measures which involve economic policy considerations and those which do not has recently become blurred. It now appears that any general measure, any measure involving economic choices, and any measure involving discretionary choices will attract the strict Schoppenstedt conditions. 63 The ECJ has used these conditions in determining most cases, particularly those considered to be sufficiently serious. 64 The burden of proof rests firmly on the applicant. The key criterion has been whether the breach was manifest and grave. 65 The case law indicates that there has been some assimilation of the term 'sufficiently serious' with the jurisprudence on State Liability. 66 Therefore, where a Community institution has only a limited discretion in legislative matters, the mere infringement of a right might amount to a sufficiently serious breach. 67 In principle, it should be easier for individuals in the future to recover compensation where the legislative act in question does not involve a wide discretion. 68 However, in areas where there are discretionary choices to be made, the hard task of proving the Schoppenstedt criteria still remains. There are few instances of successful challenges being made. In the Dumortier case the Court found that the Council had infringed the principle of equality, specifically: 'the Council was guilty of a grave and manifest disregard of the limits on the exercise of its discretionary powers in matters of the CAP'. 69 The Court has also awarded damages in situations where import provisions had violated the principle of legitimate expectation. 70 The parameters are by no means fixed and how far the ECJ will move in the future is a matter for speculation. With respect to liability for errors in drafting legislation, unless these involve matters where discretion is minimal and economic policy matters are not involved, the stricter Schoppenstedt criteria will prevail. 71 Only where a serious drafting error has occurred could it be envisaged that institutions will be held accountable. The conclusion to be drawn is that although compensation remains a possibility, the parameters are very narrow for establishing a successful action.
Administrative Acts
Administrative This legal test has led to liability of the EC on only a handful of occasions. 74 Van der Woude maintains that this is due to the regulatory nature of activities of the EC
institutions, yet he foresees a general rise in the number of future claims. 75 In line with the general theme of this paper, the failure to exercise supervisory powers properly may give rise to liability for poorly or negligently drafted legislation. This principle can also be applied to the delegation of legislative powers. Where a Community institution delegates governmental powers to some other body, the acts of 73 Various shortcomings in the performance of administrative acts have been held to constitute fault which may cause the Community to incur liability, including: lack of care in implementing powers, misuse of powers, failure to adopt a required act, defective systems adopted by an authority which can be attributed to the Community, lack of supervision, failure to rectify information in time once it becomes clear that the information provided was incorrect, failure to comply with internal rules and a breach of duty of confidentiality, failure to supervise subordinate officials or outside bodies to whom functions have been delegated, giving misleading information to the public, delay, lack of foresight. To rebut the presumption of good faith, therefore, requires proof that a Community institution acted without 'ordinary care or diligence'. Where discretion is an issue, or where economic policy applies, then the rigid Schoppenstedt criteria will have to be applied. The result is that a claim for poor or negligent drafting will be much harder to establish. It is, however, the contention of the authors that were a piece of legislation to be so badly drafted, one of the above routes could (and should) yield some form of compensation. The critical stumbling block is the level of proof required to sustain such an action.
Whilst 'transparency' in the Community institutions is now a by-word, trying to ascertain the requisite evidence in the past would have been far too onerous. The ECJ has recognised on a number of occasions that standards of good administration had not been observed, but has gone on to express nothing more than judicial regret. 80 This parallels the Article 230 situation: a breach of the principle will only be successful to ground an action for annulment if it can be shown that the act at issue
would have been different in the absence of the irregularity and the applicant had an interest in taking the point.
The difficulty of recovering compensation from the Community for losses caused by legislative measures has often been noted. 81 The Court has given two reasons for adopting a strict approach. The first, cited in the HNL 82 case, where the ECJ indicated that its view was:
explained by the consideration that the legislative authority, even where the validity of its measures is subject to judicial review, cannot always be hindered in making its decisions by the prospect of applications for damages whenever it has occasion to adopt legislative measures in the public interest which may adversely affect the interest of individuals.
Secondly, there is the argument that it would not be in the Community's interests for its potential liability in damages to be too wide should a mistake be made, due to the effects on the Community purse and on future legislative decision-making.
These two reasons explain the reluctance of the ECJ to expand the principle of culpability. As mentioned previously with respect to State Liability, there is the familiar 'floodgates' argument, applied to cover not only the number of claimants who may arrive at the door of the Court but also the size of payouts. Generally, those in control of any political and legal system would wish to limit the scope of its liability to a minimum. However, the EU is different in that it has departed from the orthodox position of immunity from suit, and with Article 288 it has developed liability for some of its actions, notably where gross negligence can be shown.
A number of other arguments can be made to explain the limited use and development of the concept. These include: the problems of balancing the public interest with private interests; the limited amount of legislation drafted by the EC that does not subsequently need to be validated by a domestic legislature; the general reluctance on the part of litigants to claim compensation for drafting errors; and, finally, regret on the part of the EC that this concept was ever introduced into the Treaty framework.
The authors of this paper believe that such arguments excluding liability for drafting errors are not persuasive. Were the Community to protect itself from the consequences of negligent drafting of legislation too comprehensively, then there would come a point when such immunity becomes oppressive, denies individual rights, and over-protects institutions from legal challenge.
Conclusions
It has been shown in this article that European Union law requires Member States to provide limited remedies to citizens who have suffered from the consequences of negligently drafted legislation. The European Union is in a position where it has an elementary form of non-contractual liability for poorly drafted or non-existent legislation in the form of State Liability or under Article 288(2). On first reading, Article 288(2) appears to be a panacea for all the ills of legislative drafting. Whilst the EU has been assertive enough to engage directly with the concept of non-contractual liability, case law indicates that the floodgates have remained tightly shut. It is, and always has been, open to the courts to construe 'illegality' narrowly, or to define it so as to preclude liability unless there has been some serious error.
In this paper the authors argue that it cannot be right for individuals to have no redress for the harm inflicted by legislative negligence. The absence of suitable remedies calls into question the legitimacy of a legislative system. In the case of domestic legislation citizens are more at the mercy of their legislators. The Law Commission has played an important role in developing new legislation and in promoting change in a common law system reliant on incremental rather than on more dramatic change.
Even so, this body has not been able to curb the government's enthusiasm for change as exemplified by the reckless drafting of the 'bad character' provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. 83 The scrutiny powers of the House of Lords as a legislative body go some way towards reducing the scope of governments to get things wrong, but do not remove the potential for legislative negligence.
The argument in favour of a tort of negligent legislative drafting becomes ever more compelling when fundamental issues going beyond pure economic loss are at stake, such as public health, food safety or property rights. On the other hand, effective immunity from actions in negligence would be contrary to entrenched human rights (such as those found in the European Convention on Human Rights and its protocols).
In answer to the question: is there anything that can be learnt from the EU? it is the authors' contention that the answer is 'yes'. It is possible to establish a system of non- 84 Section 4 of the Act provides the higher courts with the power to make a declaration of incompatibility with the rights enshrined in the European Convention.
